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Explaining Korematsu:
A Response to Dean Chemerinsky
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.*
I. WHAT MAKES A SUPREME COURT DECISION BAD OR GOOD?
II. UNDERSTANDING KOREMATSU: POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL LIMITS
ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY DECISIONS
A. A Critical Analysis of Chemerinsky’s Three Factors
B. Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims in War Powers
Cases
1. Lincoln and the Civil War Cases
2. World War II and Korematsu
3. The Cycle Continues: The Cold War and the War on
Terrorism
III. CONCLUSION

In Korematsu v. United States,1 the Supreme Court upheld Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s 1942 order, approved by Congress, removing Japanese
Americans from the West Coast to prison camps to prevent possible
sabotage and espionage.2 Even though it had become apparent by the time
the case reached the Court that there was no credible evidence of such
treachery, a majority of Justices refused to second-guess the political
branches’ prudential judgment that this evacuation was necessary during the
emergency that followed Pearl Harbor.3 Accordingly, the Court ruled that

* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale, 1988.
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. Id. at 215–24. The President authorized the Secretary of War to exclude “any persons” from
designated Pacific Coast “military areas” (i.e., those deemed especially susceptible to attack, such as
defense installations and port cities) and to provide for their transportation, food, and shelter. See
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 63 (1983) (citing Executive Order No. 9066). Although the order
did not explicitly say so, it was well understood that the targeted “persons” were Americans of
Japanese descent and that they would be interned. See id. at 38–103.
3. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–19, 223–24.
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the government’s paramount interest in national security justified the serious
infringement of the detainees’ constitutional rights to liberty and equality.4
Erwin Chemerinsky argues that Korematsu was a “terrible” decision,
based on three criteria.5 First, it had a devastating human and social impact
on Japanese Americans.6 Second, the majority opinion exhibited shoddy
judicial craftsmanship by failing to recognize that the relocation and
internment program did not meet the demanding legal test of strict scrutiny
that applies to racial discrimination.7 Third, Korematsu had a negative
doctrinal effect, especially by reinforcing the idea that constitutional rights
can be disregarded in times of crisis.8
Dean Chemerinsky’s selection of Korematsu as one of the worst
decisions ever reflects the consensus of constitutional law scholars.9 Indeed,
I have previously commented that the Court sustained “seemingly blatant
constitutional violations” that appeared to be “monstrously unlawful”10 and
that “FDR’s internment of Japanese Americans is a stain on his legacy, an
overreaction to Pearl Harbor that reflected racism more than military
exigencies.”11 Alas, I have now been asked to play devil’s advocate by
defending Korematsu.12 I can hardly do so by praising the Court’s abstract
legal analysis or moral wisdom. Instead, I will try to explain why
Korematsu and similar decisions have been rendered throughout American
history.
My account grapples with a critical question that Dean Chemerinsky
largely avoids: If Korematsu strikes us as clearly wrong, why did the Court
fail to grasp this obvious point? The answer cannot be that Hugo Black and
the five Justices who joined his opinion (including William Douglas) did not
care about individual rights and liberties, for these liberal Democrats almost

4. Id. at 223–24.
5. Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be
Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163, 164 (2011).
6. Id. at 166–67.
7. Id. at 168–69.
8. Id. at 169–70.
9. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 273, 273, 296 (noting this widespread agreement).
10. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The
Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1009, 1014 (2007)
[hereinafter Pushaw, Enemy Combatant].
11. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights and Liberties, 12 CHAP. L.
REV. 675, 686 (2009) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justifying].
12. A few other scholars have tackled this difficult task. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 294, 299 (2003) (approving Korematsu on the pragmatic ground
that the Court properly declined to use hindsight in evaluating the government’s action, but rather
recognized that federal officials had erred on the side of caution in uncertain circumstances); see
also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 289–307 (contending that the Court, in cases like Korematsu, should
candidly acknowledge that executive officials will exercise extra-constitutional powers during
emergencies and therefore should leave such judgments to the political process, instead of
rationalizing such measures as constitutionally valid).
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always sought to expand constitutional rights and vigorously protect them.
Rather, the Court reacted the way it always has in a major war: by deferring
to a strong and popular President who, with Congress’s support, had taken
an action that he deemed militarily necessary, despite infringements of
Such results are commonplace because the
constitutional rights.13
Constitution assigns war powers exclusively to the elected branches and
creates a Judiciary with limited competence to review their military
decisions.14 Only by ignoring the Constitution’s institutional framework and
its historical implementation can Dean Chemerinsky assert that the Court
must uphold individual rights equally in times of war and peace.
The foregoing themes will be developed in two parts. Part I will
critically examine Chemerinksy’s proposed factors for assessing Supreme
Court decisions, which improperly suggest that the Justices should creatively
construe the Constitution on a case-by-case basis to achieve liberal social
results. Part II will explain Korematsu in light of the Constitution’s political
and institutional arrangements, which throughout history have typically led
the Court to yield to the President and Congress during wartime.
I. WHAT MAKES A SUPREME COURT DECISION BAD OR GOOD?
Dean Chemerinsky sets forth three assessment criteria. First, the
Justices should have the empathy to understand the human and social impact
of their decisions.15 These effects can be horrible, as cases like Dred Scott v.
Sandford16 and Plessy v. Ferguson17 illustrate.18 Second, Chemerinsky
considers the quality of judicial craftsmanship: “Is the opinion wellreasoned? Is precedent accurately cited? Does the opinion adequately
address opposing views?”19 He offers as examples of poor craftsmanship
Bush v. Gore20 and Griswold v. Connecticut21—although he clarifies that the
problem with Griswold was finding a right to privacy in the “penumbras” of
the Bill of Rights, instead of holding that “liberty” in the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause includes “a fundamental right of

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

I have elaborated this thesis in Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1009–47.
See id. at 1005–23.
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 168–69.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 165–66.
Id. at 165.
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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individuals to choose whether to procreate or not.”22 Third, Chemerinsky
analyzes the impact of a case on the later development of legal doctrine.23
For instance, Lochner v. New York24 had a pernicious influence because it
led federal courts for three decades to strike down state laws protecting
employees and consumers.25
Dean Chemerinsky asserts that “there could be widespread agreement
that these are appropriate criteria to use in evaluating Supreme Court
decisions.”26 Perhaps, but I think his proffered factors give short shrift to the
Constitution as law and instead focus on the Court developing doctrines that
implement liberal social ideas. Because the Justices swear to uphold the
Constitution, our supreme and fundamental law, the key question should be
whether they have done so.
Therefore, I would judge the Court’s opinions based on a two-step
“Neo-Federalist” analysis.27 First, the Justices should try to determine, in
light of the Constitution’s structure and underlying political theory, a
disputed clause’s original “meaning” (its ordinary definition in 1787),
“intent” (its drafters’ purposes), and “understanding” (the sense of its
ratifiers and earlier implementers).28 Second, the Court should then preserve
those originalist principles that remain relevant, albeit filtered through two
centuries of practice and precedent, by developing workable legal rules that
can be applied as impartially and consistently as possible.29
I recognize, of course, that each of these steps requires the exercise of
judicial discretion. First, the historical materials do not always disclose clear
answers.30 However, sometimes they do, and more often they at least

22. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 165.
23. Id. at 166.
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166.
26. Id. at 164.
27. For a detailed description and defense of this methodology, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393,
397–99, 454, 470–72 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability].
28. I have long drawn subtle distinctions among original “meaning,” “intent,” and
“understanding.” See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear
John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 478 n.35 (1998)
(citing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996)).
29. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (employing this methodology to devise and apply
rules to determine whether or not Congress has exceeded its power “to regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States”).
30. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 740–54, 782–85, 799–867 (2001) (acknowledging that neither
Article III nor the records of the Convention and Ratification debates directly mention inherent
judicial authority, but identifying legal principles to govern such powers based upon constitutional
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narrow the range of plausible interpretations. Second, the Court would have
to make delicate judgments as to which elements of the original meaning,
intent, and understanding are worth maintaining and how they can best be
promoted. Despite these difficulties, Justices should strive to articulate and
apply rules that are rooted in the Constitution’s text and history, not simply
rely on their prudential wisdom to reach results that strike them as politically
or socially correct.31
Dean Chemerinsky would reject my rules-based approach as misguided.
Indeed, he has long maintained that the Court should construe the
Constitution by exercising discretion, informed by the Justices’ sense of
morality, to give specific meaning to the Constitution’s abstract language—
an indeterminate and evolutionary process that strives to identify and
preserve society’s fundamental values.32 But why should five Justices’
personal opinions about morality and basic social values trump the People’s
collective wisdom about such matters embodied in the Constitution—or the
policy preferences of elected representatives that do not run afoul of any
constitutional provision as “the People” understood it?33
The acid test to determine if a judge or scholar has a legally principled
constitutional approach is whether its application sometimes leads to results
that conflict with that individual’s politics or ideology. For instance, Akhil
Amar, a liberal Democrat, has employed a Neo-Federalist methodology34 to
arrive at conclusions that appeal to conservative Republicans like me in
areas such as abortion and constitutional criminal procedure.35 Conversely, I
have often interpreted the Constitution’s text, structure, history, and
precedent to reach results that I find politically distasteful.36
structure and theory, early congressional practice, and precedent from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries).
31. I have developed this idea in a symposium essay. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of
Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1185–87,
1206–11 (2003).
32. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 45–141 (1987).
33. To be clear, I agree with Dean Chemerinsky that “the Supreme Court has tremendous
discretion” and that it is embarrassing when nominees like John Roberts and Sonia Sotomayor deny
this fact. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 163. Unlike Chemerinsky, however, I do not think that such
vast prudential power is good, and hence I would try to cabin it by insisting that the Court make a
good faith effort to determine the actual law of the Constitution, grounded in its text and history.
34. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985).
35. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 68, 75–79, 81–82, 109–14 (2000).
36. For instance, I have criticized the restrictive interpretation of Article III, championed by selfprofessed judicial conservatives like Justices Frankfurter and Scalia, as inconsistent with Article III’s
language, its history, the structural principle of separation of powers, and pre-New Deal precedent.
See, e.g., Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 27, at 395–99, 454–512; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article
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To take one example, I attacked Bush v. Gore37 on two grounds. First,
the case should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable because the
Constitution commits resolution of presidential election disputes to the
political process (initially to state officials, then to Congress to ascertain the
validity of the electoral votes).38 Second, contrary to the majority’s holding,
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause’s language, history, or precedent
prohibits inconsistencies within states in counting votes.39 Consequently, I
agree with Dean Chemerinsky that “Bush v. Gore is . . . a poorly reasoned
judicial opinion.”40 But so is Baker v. Carr,41 in which the Court incorrectly
reached the political questions presented and invented a new Equal
Protection requirement: that state legislative apportionments must be based
solely on population.42 Legal consistency would dictate that Chemerinsky
condemn both Bush and Baker, but he has applauded the latter decision.43
The most logical explanation is that Bush produced a conservative result,
whereas Baker reached a liberal one.
Interpretation of the Due Process Clause provides another illustration of
the advantages of apolitical Neo-Federalism over Dean Chemerinsky’s
approach. The Constitution’s text, political theory, and history all indicate
that the government cannot deprive a person of “liberty” (i.e., physical
freedom) without “due process of law”—a fair hearing before an impartial
decisionmaker.44 Accordingly, I have criticized the Court’s manipulation of
the concept of “liberty” to achieve political and ideological goals, regardless
of whether they are conservative (such as the “freedom of contract” rationale
of cases like Lochner) or liberal (such as the right to abortion fabricated in
Roe v. Wade).45
By contrast, Dean Chemerinsky condemns Lochner yet praises the
Court for creating a “fundamental right” to make choices about

III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447, 465–532 (1994); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847.
37. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
38. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror,
18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 359–60, 390–94 (2001) [hereinafter Pushaw, Conservative Mirror].
39. See id. at 394; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the
Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and
Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 619–23 (2001).
40. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 165.
41. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
42. Id. at 209–37.
43. See Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 38, at 379–81 (describing this politicized
approach taken by Chemerinsky and other scholars).
44. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 663–64, 718 (1988)
(discussing these traditional procedural mechanisms to safeguard “liberty”).
45. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common
Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 519 (2008).
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procreation.46 But if he believes that the Justices can craft constitutional
rights to implement their personal notions of morality and their social
values, both Lochner and Roe must be equally valid. Indeed, Chemerinsky
would have to accept as legitimate the overruling of Roe and Casey47 by a
majority of Justices, based on their traditional moral and social convictions.
Adopting Chemerinsky’s criteria, the Court could conclude that Roe was a
bad decision because it displayed sloppy judicial craftsmanship, had a
devastating human and social impact by allowing over forty million
abortions, and had negative doctrinal effects by extending its dubious
privacy rationale to areas like sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.48 Indeed,
Justice Scalia has made such arguments.49
Chemerinsky would likely respond that Roe correctly recognized a
fundamental right to make reproductive choices, that its doctrinal impact in
cases like Lawrence has been positive, and that its social effect has been
beneficial by enhancing women’s personal autonomy and economic
opportunities. But there is no objective way to determine whether this moral
and social vision, or Justice Scalia’s, is correct. That is why Scalia would
leave abortion to the political process, despite his deeply held pro-life
views.50
Put simply, conceptions of morality and the social good are subjective
and contested, which makes it troubling when the Court adopts one set of
beliefs and imposes it on the nation under the guise of constitutional
interpretation. That is exactly what the Court did in cases like Roe, Dred
Scott v. Sandford,51 and Plessy v. Ferguson.52

46. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166.
47. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), two
Justices voted to reaffirm Roe in its entirety. See id. at 911–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 922–43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued a “joint opinion” preserving Roe’s central holding that
women had a right to abortion before fetal viability, but giving states more latitude to regulate
abortion. See id. at 834–901.
48. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling recent precedent and holding that the right to privacy
includes the freedom of consenting adults to engage in sodomy).
49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst
Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003) (condemning Casey).
50. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–81, 994–96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney rejected the
dissenters’ moderate and humane constitutional approach, and instead adopted the most extreme
proslavery position: that the Constitution did not include blacks (even free ones) as “persons” or
“citizens,” that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, and that any attempt to do so
would deprive emigrating slave owners of their property without due process. See AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 98, 253–54, 264–65, 380–82, 405 (2005)
(summarizing and criticizing Dred Scott on these grounds).

179

In short, I reject the notion that the Justices should interpret the
Constitution by exercising virtually unrestrained discretion to identify and
protect what they feel are fundamental social values, based on their moral
sensibilities. Rather, the Court should apply a Neo-Federalist methodology
to constitutional provisions, which would in most instances yield rules of
law that can be applied fairly and consistently.53
In rare situations, however, a careful study of the Constitution’s
language, structure, history, and precedent leads to the conclusion that a
particular issue cannot readily be resolved through principled legal
decisionmaking. The best example is the federal government’s exercise of
its constitutional war powers in a manner that allegedly violates individual
rights. The Court has always struggled in such cases because (1) it is not
well-equipped institutionally to review the political branches’ determination
that a specific act was necessary to ensure military success; and (2)
invalidating such an action could lead to a loss of American lives and limbs
(or even the war itself).54 Therefore, I disagree with Dean Chemerinsky that
we can readily compare wartime decisions like Korematsu with those that
exclusively involved domestic affairs such as Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner,
Griswold, Roe, and Bush. I aim to show that his suggested criteria, which
are of limited utility even in the latter cases, provide almost no help in
evaluating the Court’s opinions concerning military actions.
II. UNDERSTANDING KOREMATSU: POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL LIMITS ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY DECISIONS
Dean Chemerinsky applies his three criteria to Korematsu and gleans
several lessons. I will begin by summarizing the inadequacies of his
approach to Korematsu. I will then provide a more complex account of
constitutional adjudication during wartime, which will help us comprehend
why the Court decided Korematsu the way it did.
A. A Critical Analysis of Chemerinsky’s Three Factors
First, Dean Chemerinsky details the negative human and social impact
of the majority’s holding on the lives of 110,000 Japanese Americans, who
were deprived of their liberty and property because of their race.55 I do not
wish to minimize their hardship by observing that World War II claimed

52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Contrary to the majority’s vision of segregation as the appropriate
social and moral order, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited states from precisely
the sort of racial discrimination that Louisiana had practiced by separating black and white
passengers on trains. Id. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
54. See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1017–47.
55. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166–67.
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over sixty million lives56 and that hundreds of millions of people
experienced injury, starvation, and massive property destruction.57 Most
importantly to the United States, our armed forces incurred over 400,000
deaths and many more wounded.58 As these statistics remind us, the Justices
living through the war had a very different perspective on the human and
social impact of their decisions than we do today. That is why this proposed
criterion is not very illuminating in assessing Korematsu or any other
wartime case.
Second, Dean Chemerinsky stresses the poor judicial craftsmanship of
Justice Black’s opinion: The Court properly created the strict scrutiny test
and found national security to be a compelling government interest, but
incorrectly held that the summary imprisonment of Japanese Americans was
a necessary (or even reasonable) means to achieve that interest.59 Rather, the
Court should have required the federal government to perform “individual
screening” to determine whether any people of Japanese descent posed an
actual threat.60 From this failure to do so, Chemerinsky draws the lessons
that detention should only be based on individualized suspicion of a crime
and that Americans should always keep in mind that their governments have
engaged in race discrimination.61
These conclusions are generally sound as to garden-variety Due Process
and Equal Protection cases, but they may not hold true in the extraordinary
conditions of wartime. Most pertinently, in Korematsu the Court ruled that,
on the record presented, it lacked a factual basis to dispute the federal
government’s judgment that the post-Pearl Harbor emergency did not allow
time for investigation of each Japanese American and that mass evacuation
was necessary to prevent any acts of espionage or sabotage (as even one
might have crippled the war effort).62 As we shall see, these same
problems—the Judiciary’s relative lack of competence and information vis56. See GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II
894 (1994). This total includes Nazi Germany’s systematic murder of six million Jews. Dean
Chemerinsky compares this Holocaust to the internment of Japanese Americans. Chemerinsky,
supra note 5, at 166–67. I do not think that imprisoning 110,000 people can meaningfully be
equated with killing six million. But perhaps this difference simply illustrates my point that
judgments about human and social impact are inherently subjective.
57. See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 5 (2001) (deploring the mistreatment of Americans of Japanese descent, but
acknowledging that these “human costs . . . were insignificant compared with the military casualties
of World War II”).
58. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 141 (2010).
59. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166.
60. Id. at 168.
61. Id. at 169–71.
62. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944).
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à-vis the Executive, and its fear that second-guessing the government might
lead to disaster—arise in every case reviewing military actions.63
Such institutional dynamics are built into the Constitution. Thus,
although the United States has formally apologized for Korematsu64 and
both the Bush and Obama Administrations have been careful after
September 11 to avoid a repeat (i.e., targeting all persons of Saudi Arabian
and Egyptian descent merely because those were the nationalities of the
terrorists),65 such a scenario cannot be dismissed as unthinkable. For
example, imagine if al Qaeda had immediately followed its 9/11 attacks by
killing half of Chicago’s residents with biological weapons, and the
government then received reliable intelligence of a forthcoming nuclear
assault on a major West Coast city. In that situation, the President would
probably take drastic action (which might include discrimination based on
ethnicity), and in a legal challenge the Court could hardly be expected to
mechanically apply its usual rules of individualized suspicion for common
crimes and strict scrutiny of racial classifications.
Third, Dean Chemerinsky argues that Korematsu and other war powers
cases have had a destructive doctrinal effect: “In times of crisis, especially
foreign-based crisis, we compromise our most basic constitutional rights
only to realize in hindsight that we were not made any safer.”66 The lesson
he derives from this phenomenon is that the Court should not abdicate its
responsibility to enforce constitutional rights during military emergencies.67
In reality, however, no single war powers decision has much lasting
doctrinal influence because each case is sui generis, and Korematsu is hardly
a robust precedent.68 Furthermore, although Chemerinsky has the luxury of

63. See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text.
64. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2006) (apologizing and paying
reparations to those who had been imprisoned).
65. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, Titles I & X (Oct. 26, 2001)
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) (prohibiting
discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans and providing for review of all claims of civil
rights abuses).
66. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 169.
67. See id. at 169–70; cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors
Epstein and Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959 (2004) (arguing that federal courts usually yield to the
President in wartime primarily because of political and institutional factors that are embedded in the
Constitution’s structure, not because the judges psychologically share the President’s “skewed risk
assessment” whereby threats to national security are overestimated and liberty interests are
undervalued).
68. Chemerinsky concedes that the Court has never relied upon Korematsu in its Equal
Protection rulings. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 171. His suggestion that the case has
nonetheless contributed to a culture of needlessly sacrificing constitutional rights during
emergencies is debatable. If anything, Korematsu has had the opposite effect. For instance, in
waging the War on Terrorism, President Bush and Congress took great pains to prevent “another
Korematsu.” See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. Despite their efforts, the Court has
bent over backwards to thwart any perceived curtailments of the federal constitutional and statutory
rights of detained enemy combatants. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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hindsight, Presidents in the thick of war do not, and the Court has never
judged them on that basis.69 Moreover, sometimes presidential decisions
that curtailed constitutional liberties most likely did make the United States
safer—although such conclusions are inevitably speculative:
[I]t is impossible to say with any certainty whether or not Presidents
like Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt had to infringe
constitutional liberties the way they did in order to win their wars.
Perhaps they could have achieved the same results with fewer
intrusions. But maybe greater solicitude for personal freedoms
would have led to defeat, or to a victory that exacted a far greater
cost in blood and money. Speculating about such matters is an
academic exercise. All we know for sure is that these Presidents
took the actions they deemed necessary to prevail, and they did.
For better or worse, the Constitution commits to the President
almost unbridled discretion to determine what must be done to meet
a military emergency. These decisions must be made quickly and
with imperfect information, and they are then judged by Congress,
voters, and posterity. All of these groups tend to be quite forgiving
of the President if he triumphs.70
Finally, and most importantly, the Constitution’s text, structure, history, and
implementing practice and precedent all refute Dean Chemerinsky’s
argument that the Court should apply the same standard of review in times
of war and peace.
B. Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims in War Powers Cases
The Constitution contemplates that only the political branches have the
democratic legitimacy, institutional competence, and political incentives to
formulate and implement military and foreign policy.71 Article I authorizes
Congress to provide for the national defense; declare war; and create, fund,

69. See Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, at 696 (making this point, and acknowledging that
“with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that certain Presidential actions went beyond the pale,”
such as “Roosevelt’s mass internment of Japanese Americans”).
70. See id. at 675–76 (footnotes omitted); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 608–10, 612–22 (2003) (setting forth and
criticizing the prevalent libertarian view that presidents routinely curb civil rights and liberties to a
far greater extent than is necessary to ensure military victory).
71. See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1017–23 (analyzing the pertinent
constitutional provisions and historical sources).
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and regulate the Army and Navy.72 Article II confers on the President “[t]he
executive Power”73 (to implement Congress’s military measures) and makes
him the “Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.74 Moreover, Article II
presupposes that the President can unilaterally respond to emergencies
because he alone possesses all executive power, is always on duty, and can
take swift and decisive action based on the expert advice of his subordinates,
who filter masses of information (often confidential).75
In sum, the Constitution gives the political departments all war powers,
as well as the weapons to check each other.76 By contrast, the Framers
excluded the Judiciary from warmaking.77 Therefore, bare claims that a
military act exceeded the powers of Congress under Article I, or the
President under Article II, raise political rather than judicial questions.78
However, judicial review might be proper when the exercise of war
powers allegedly violates a plaintiff’s individual legal rights. Unfortunately,
the historical materials do not indicate whether such cases should be (1)
dismissed as political questions; (2) treated the same as normal domestic

72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11–16.
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
75. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471–73, 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
AMAR, supra note 51, at 132–33. In contrast to the President, Congress and the courts work slowly
and deliberatively in fixed sessions with frequent recesses. See AMAR, supra note 51, at 131–204,
351–63 (stressing such institutional differences in the Constitution’s scheme of separation of
powers).
76. For instance, Congress can investigate the President’s military actions, cut off funding for
them, and impeach executive officials for egregious misconduct. Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11,
at 679–80. Conversely, the President can veto bills that do not promote his military vision, exercise
discretion in executing laws pertaining to the armed forces, and use the unique advantages of the
unitary Executive to get his way in times of war. See id. (describing such checks).
77. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 27, at 507–08 (demonstrating that the Constitution’s
framework of shared Legislative–Executive power over military affairs necessarily excluded the
Judiciary); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 176–82, 269–70, 284, 287–90, 295–96, 300 (1996) (showing
that the Convention and Ratification debates contain no hint that federal judges could or would
review the exercise of war powers by Congress or the President, who were given complete authority
in this area and were expected to check each other).
78. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
The Court has consistently reaffirmed this principle of nonjusticiability. See, e.g., Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–71 (1803); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28–33
(1827); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38–45 (1849); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 243, 251–54 (1863); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 71–77 (1867); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770, 774–87 (1950); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–12 (1973); see
also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2002) (citing these cases and
others in examining problems with the political question doctrine and proposing a solution based on
historical understandings).
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decisions; or (3) resolved through a compromise approach of exercising
jurisdiction but showing great deference to the political branches.79
Almost all liberal scholars share Dean Chemerinsky’s opinion that the
Constitution requires the second approach—asserting judicial review
vigorously at all times—and that therefore the Court’s contrary decisions
like Korematsu are lamentable exceptions to this rule.80 This view, however,
does not have a firm foundation in the Constitution, either as written or as
applied.
Rather, the Court has generally recognized war as unique and hence
chosen the third option, which strikes me as a sensible way of balancing the
Constitution’s authorization of judicial review to safeguard constitutional
rights with its provisions entrusting our national defense to Congress and the
President.81 The degree of deference shown to the elected branches has
varied with the facts and circumstances, with three considerations emerging
as especially salient.82 The first is the gravity and urgency of the military
crisis, and the perceived necessity for the President’s responsive measures.
The second is the egregiousness and magnitude of the resulting violation of
individual rights. The third is the likelihood that the Court’s orders will be
obeyed, which depends upon the President’s political strength and popularity
and also on whether the emergency is ongoing or has passed. Of course,
such political and pragmatic calculations are made sub silentio, but they tend
to drive the decisions far more than the formal legal analysis set forth in the
Court’s opinions.83
Once one recognizes the inevitably political dimension of judicial
review during wartime, a historical pattern emerges. On the one hand, the
Court always defers to strong Presidents in the midst of serious military
conflicts when they take what they deem to be necessary steps, despite
invasions of constitutional rights. On the other hand, when a crisis has
passed, if a President is politically weak yet continues to act aggressively,
the Court reasserts itself by questioning the need for the President’s action

79. See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1023.
80. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 171–72; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note
10, at 1006–08 (citing like-minded academics). Some liberals have challenged this orthodoxy. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 66 (approving the Court’s
approach of taking jurisdiction to protect individual rights yet exhibiting great respect for the
military judgments of Congress and the President).
81. See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1013–17, 1023.
82. For detailed support for the analysis in this paragraph, see id. at 1013–16, 1046–47.
83. Typically, these opinions discuss three questions. First, did Article II or a federal statute
authorize the President to take the challenged action? Second, if so, did he nonetheless violate
individual constitutional rights? Third, if there was such an infringement, was it necessary to protect
national security?
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and upholding individual rights. This cycle can best be illustrated by
examining the Civil War and World War II.
1. Lincoln and the Civil War Cases
Lincoln argued that the President’s duty to preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitution (and the Union it created) warranted the temporary sacrifice
of individual constitutional provisions.84 Accordingly, he made many
unilateral decisions that Dean Chemerinsky and others would decry as
unconstitutional.85
The three most famous actions implicated the Due Process Clause.
First, even though that provision prohibits the government from summarily
taking property, Lincoln responded to the attacks on Fort Sumter by
blockading Confederate ports and seizing all offending ships (and their
cargo).86 Second, he established and staffed military commissions instead of
providing court access.87 Third, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas
corpus.88 His initial goal was to jail Confederate sympathizers in Maryland
who were urging that slave state to secede, a move which would have
crippled the war effort by cutting off Washington from the rest of the
Union.89 Chief Justice Taney ordered the President to cease such
detentions.90 Lincoln ignored Taney and justified his conduct in an address
to Congress that stressed the President’s paramount duty to defend the
Constitution by preserving the United States Government.91
Congress backed the President and retroactively approved his actions.92
The Court rolled over and upheld Lincoln’s seizure of ships in The Prize

84. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 691, 722 (2004) (book review).
85. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 169–70. But see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S
CONSTITUTION 7–8, 15–25, 115–95 (2003) (cataloguing the measures Lincoln imposed that seemed
inconsistent with many constitutional provisions, but generally defending their validity).
86. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–71 (1863) (sustaining the blockade and
seizures as part of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief).
87. See FARBER, supra note 85, at 8, 17, 19–20, 118, 144–45, 163–75.
88. Id. at 16–17, 19, 117, 144, 157–63, 192–95.
89. Id. at 16–19, 117, 144, 157–63; AMAR, supra note 51, at 122, 355.
90. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (holding
that Lincoln had usurped Congress’s exclusive Article I power to suspend habeas and the Judiciary’s
Article III power to determine whether citizens had been detained in violation of their due process
rights).
91. He said: “‘[M]easures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming
indispensable to the preservation of the . . . nation.’ . . . ‘[A]re all the laws, but one [i.e., the Habeas
Corpus Clause], to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?’”
See Paulsen, supra note 84, at 721, 723 (quoting Lincoln).
92. See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12
Stat. 755 (specifically authorizing Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus). Although
civil libertarians continue to portray Lincoln as a tyrant, many scholars have correctly emphasized
that he respected our constitutional democracy and consistently sought Congress’s approval for his
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Cases93 and his use of military commissions in Vallandigham94 on the
ground that it could not review the President’s exercise of his discretion as
Commander in Chief to make such decisions.95
After the war had ended, Lincoln had been assassinated, and the
politically weak Andrew Johnson had become President, both Congress96
and the Court reasserted themselves. In Ex parte Milligan,97 a majority of
Justices invalidated a military commission on the ground that the habeas
petitioner had a right to an ordinary jury trial.98 The Court declared: “The
Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances.”99 This grand statement conflicted with the
Court’s candid confession that it had failed to live up to this ideal during the
Civil War100 and with its later capitulation to Presidents during military
crises, such as its approval of Woodrow Wilson’s effective suspension of
freedom of expression during and after World War I.101
Dean Chemerinsky does not mention this historical context. Rather, he
echoes Milligan’s empty rhetoric by asserting that “[t]he Court should not
abdicate its responsibility to enforce the Constitution, even in wartime. . . .
The Court has to be there to enforce the Constitution for all Americans at all
times.”102 Similarly, he claims that Lincoln restricted constitutional rights
and liberties without making the country any safer.103 But how does
Chemerinsky know this? It is impossible to determine what would have
happened if Lincoln had not done what he did. Perhaps the Union still
would have won the Civil War. But it is at least equally plausible to

actions. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 51, at 21, 38–39, 51–52, 118–19, 132, 146–47, 188, 196, 275,
368–73, 471–72; FARBER, supra note 85, at 18, 24, 118, 137–48, 192–97.
93. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–82 (1863).
94. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 243, 252–54 (1864).
95. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670; Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 253–54.
96. Controlled by Republicans (the same party as Lincoln), Congress pushed through legislation
over the vetoes of the Democrat Johnson and eventually impeached him. See MICHAEL LES
BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 1–5, 89–95 (1973).
97. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
98. Id. at 118–27.
99. Id. at 120–21.
100. Id. at 109.
101. The Court went along with Wilson after he persuaded Congress to enact sweeping
legislation instituting a draft, mobilizing domestic resources for the war effort, and curbing First
Amendment rights to criticize the United States. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 94–96 (1976) (analyzing the relevant statutes and the Court’s
decisions upholding them).
102. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 172.
103. Id. at 169–70.
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conclude that Lincoln’s forceful actions helped save our constitutional
Why is
government, defeat the Confederacy, and end slavery.104
Chemerinsky more concerned about the rights of Confederate sympathizers
than with their hundreds of thousands of military victims, not to mention the
plight of four million slaves?
In short, the Court yielded to Lincoln—a strong and determined
President who defied the Judiciary, yet enjoyed congressional support—
because it could not realistically overturn his discretionary judgments that
his actions (even those that seemed to flagrantly violate the Constitution)
were necessary to win a war for the very survival of our nation. Once the
emergency had passed, the Court took the offensive against a politically
vulnerable President by upholding individual rights in the face of the
Executive Branch’s invocation of military necessity.105
The same pattern recurred in the mid-twentieth century. The Court
caved in to the popular Franklin Roosevelt when he infringed constitutional
rights during the cataclysmic World War II, then reversed course in 1952
against the politically weak Harry Truman at the tail end of the Korean War.
2. World War II and Korematsu
Korematsu becomes intelligible if viewed through the lens of history.
The Justices involved in the case were seasoned politicians. Seven of them
had been appointed by the immensely popular FDR, who shattered the
tradition of two-term Presidents as he led America through the Depression
and World War II.106 Furthermore, the Court understood the gravity of the
emergency: Totalitarian regimes menaced not only the United States but all
democracies. Perhaps most significantly, the Justices did not naively believe
that they could stop Roosevelt from taking actions he had determined were
needed to win the war, even those that seemed to run afoul of the
Constitution.107
Indeed, as early as the mid-1930s, FDR had made it clear that he was
willing to defy the Court, which initially attempted to thwart his New Deal
104. See Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, at 677.
105. Id. at 694.
106. Roosevelt was elected four times with decisive majorities. See United States Presidential
LEIP’S
ATLAS
OF
U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS,
Election
Results,
DAVID
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS (select “General by Year,” then follow the links to 1932, 1936,
1940, and 1944) (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). He appointed political professionals who were
sympathetic to his policies, not experienced judges who might be more independent-minded. See
William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 525 (2005).
The only non-FDR appointees left on the Court by 1944 were Chief Justice Stone and Justice
Roberts. See IRONS, supra note 2, at 228, 310, 313–14, 318–19.
107. For example, the President seized over sixty plants where labor disputes and other
difficulties had hindered the war effort. See ROSSITER, supra note 101, at 59–63 (describing
Roosevelt’s action and the Court’s wimpy response). The Court delayed until the war’s end before
entertaining Fifth Amendment challenges to those seizures, then dismissed the cases as moot. Id.
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programs as unconstitutional.108 In 1942, he again manifested that disdainful
attitude after the Court in Ex parte Quirin109 agreed to hear the appeal of
Nazi saboteurs (including an American citizen) who had been captured in
New York. They claimed that the imposition of the death penalty by a
Roosevelt-appointed military commission had violated their due process
right to an ordinary trial.110 The American public was outraged by the
Court’s interference, and the President let the Justices know through back
channels that he was going to execute the spies no matter what.111 The Court
immediately folded.112
In short, by 1944 it had become obvious that the Court was neither
willing nor able to incur the wrath of Roosevelt by striking down his major
war measures, however egregiously they might have invaded constitutional
rights. Hence, it is not surprising that the Court in Korematsu held that the
government’s overriding interest in national security outweighed the
infringement of Japanese Americans’ rights to liberty and equality:113
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast
and felt constrained to take proper security measures, [and] because
they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded
that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West

108. Roosevelt reacted to these unfavorable cases by threatening to expand the Court’s size to
fifteen and to appoint six new Justices who favored his positions. See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel
P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 671–73 (2009) (outlining this
Court-packing plan). Similarly, in 1935, if the Court had invalidated FDR’s decision to take the
United States off the gold standard, he was prepared to defy the Court and precipitate a
constitutional crisis. See William E. Leuchtenburg, Charles Evan Hughes: The Center Holds, 83
N.C. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2005). Thus, the Justices realized that Roosevelt was unlikely to alter his
war policies because of an adverse Court holding. As his Attorney General remarked, FDR
illustrated that “the Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.” See FRANCIS
BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962); see also Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military
Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 278
(2002) (noting the popularity of, and respect commanded by, Roosevelt and Biddle).
109. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
110. Id. at 22–48 (setting forth and rejecting this argument).
111. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309,
319–32.
112. Id.
113. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–25 (1944).
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Coast temporarily . . . . [T]he need for action was great, and time
was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm
perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified.114
In other words, the Court recognized that Presidents in the heat of war must
make swift decisions based on military and foreign policy intelligence that is
constantly shifting, and thus judged Roosevelt’s conduct based on the facts
available to him, not those that later emerged.115
The attack on Pearl Harbor floored FDR and panicked the nation.116
The President immediately investigated this disaster through various military
and civilian advisers and committees. Many of these experts (including his
Secretary of the Navy and a commission headed by Justice Owen Roberts)
concluded that the attack on Hawaii had been facilitated by Japanese spies
and saboteurs living on the island, and that similar dangers lurked on the
West Coast.117 Roosevelt understood that even one successful act of
sabotage on a key target (such as a dam or bridge) could imperil the entire
war effort.118 Furthermore, Western politicians, citizens, interest groups, and

114. Id. at 223–24.
115. See id. at 218–19, 223–24; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 70, at 608–10, 620,
623–26 (arguing that we should evaluate the actions of government officials during crises based not
on hindsight, but rather on the facts and circumstances that existed at the time those leaders made
their decisions); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 287 (to similar effect).
116. Many historians have exhaustively examined Roosevelt’s response to this emergency, which
culminated in his order excluding Americans of Japanese descent from the Pacific Coast. See, e.g.,
MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 231–302,
362–74 (1949); ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 72–124.
117. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox went to Hawaii to investigate and reached this
conclusion. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 55–56 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund 1997)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMISSION]. Similarly, Justice Roberts’s special commission found
that Japanese nationals had committed espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, and Roberts had
privately told FDR and Secretary of War Henry Stimson that Japanese Americans were
untrustworthy. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 94–95; William H. Rehnquist, When the Laws
Were Silent, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1998, at 76. Roosevelt also created his own informal intelligence
system through journalist John Franklin Carter and businessman Curtis Munson, and the cover letter
summarizing their reports could have given the impression that Japanese Americans posed a great
danger (assuming Roosevelt failed to read their full findings, which he often did). See, e.g.,
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 66–68; see also BIDDLE, supra note 108, at 187 (describing how
Roosevelt would put his papers in a pile if they were too long or boring, to be removed by his
secretary).
118. In a letter to FDR, John Carter summarized five key points from a report by Curtis Munson.
The fifth point stated:
[D]ams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere. The
harbor at San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with grenades and a
little study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might
actually die of thirst. One railway bridge at the exit from the mountains in some cases
could tie up three or four main railroads.

190

[Vol. 39: 173, 2011]

Explaining Korematsu
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the media were clamoring for the removal of Japanese Americans.119
Ultimately, Roosevelt chose this fateful course of action based on the
recommendation of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who in turn had relied
heavily upon General John DeWitt, the military commander on the West
Coast.120 FDR thought that such military experts were in the best position to
evaluate the threat,121 even though other executive officials disagreed with
the evacuation.122
Like all Presidents in wartime, Roosevelt had to act quickly by using his
best judgment about how to achieve military success in light of the (often
conflicting) advice of his subordinates. He signed the exclusion order within
hours of it being placed on his desk, and this subject was never discussed at
a Cabinet meeting.123 FDR did not have much time to ponder the
constitutional implications of this action because he was preoccupied with
making critical strategic decisions in a truly global war (with Nazi Germany
an especially formidable foe).124
Roosevelt also knew that defeating America’s far-flung enemies would
require massive manpower. But America’s mothers and fathers (particularly

ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 68 (quoting Memo, John Franklin Carter to FDR, Nov. 7, 1941, RG
210, Box 573, NA, rpt. in CWRIC Papers, p. 3663 (reel 3, p. 638)). Roosevelt sent the report to the
Secretary of War, highlighting only this fifth point about the danger of sabotage. See id.
119. See GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 2–3, 19–179, 204–25, 253–59, 320–48, 361–65, 371–74;
IRONS, supra note 2, at 38–47, 268–69; ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 87–93, 95–98.
120. DeWitt urged the relocation of Japanese Americans as a military imperative. See, e.g.,
BIDDLE, supra note 108, at 217–18; GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 40–41, 274–322, 337, 362–63,
365–66, 370; IRONS, supra note 2, at 25–64, 364–65; ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 84–89, 96–97,
101, 105–07. Roosevelt generally deferred to the military on defense issues. See BIDDLE, supra
note 108, at 219; see also ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 110.
121. See ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 110; see also IRONS, supra note 2, at 58, 363–65.
122. For example, the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence believed that they had adequately
identified members of the espionage network and that therefore the proposed mass removal was
unnecessary. See IRONS, supra note 2, at 21–23. Similarly, Attorney General Biddle concluded that
the military had failed to demonstrate the need for such an evacuation, and he attempted to convey
his opinion to Roosevelt. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 114, at 78; see also
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 86–88, 92–94, 97–109 (describing Biddle’s opposition to internment).
123. See GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 271–72.
124. See ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 92. Roosevelt left no record of his thoughts on the removal
and detention of Japanese Americans, thereby forcing us to speculate about his state of mind. See
IRONS, supra note 2, at 354, 364–65. We do know that FDR was focused on overall war planning
and hence entrusted the internment decision—which he considered to be comparatively
unimportant—to his military advisers, without consulting his Cabinet or requiring a thorough
independent review. Id. at 58, 363–65. Moreover, unlike Lincoln, Roosevelt was neither an
attorney nor a constitutional thinker. Consequently, it seems likely that he either did not consider the
constitutional ramifications of his order or simply assumed that the President could take any actions
he deemed militarily necessary. Id. at 364. Overall, FDR appears to have been negligent, in both a
human and legal sense, in failing to devote more attention to the plight of Americans of Japanese
descent. Id. at 57, 364.
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in the West) would be reluctant to send their sons to fight overseas if they
felt insecure at home.125 Such fears, whether well-founded or not, became
He apparently made the cold-blooded
part of FDR’s calculus.126
determination that Japanese Americans would have to endure
disproportionate sacrifices to ensure the success of the overall war effort.127
Of course, as Dean Chemerinsky stresses, many of Roosevelt’s trusted
advisers (especially his West Coast military leaders)—not to mention
politicians, journalists, and citizens—were motivated by raw racial
prejudice.128 Especially shameful were FDR’s executive subordinates who
manipulated intelligence data to wildly exaggerate the threat posed by
Japanese Americans129 and Justice Department officials who withheld
crucial information from the Judiciary in the Korematsu litigation.130 Here,
however, I am focusing on the actions of Roosevelt himself and the Court
that sustained his exclusion order, and I do not think that their behavior can
be attributed to simple racism.131 Rather, FDR had to consider multiple
factors under extreme time pressure,132 and the Court felt compelled to reach
125. I thank Akhil Amar for bringing this point to my attention.
126. Roosevelt’s internment decision was influenced in part by the widespread public
apprehension, based largely on hysteria and racism, that Japan might invade the West Coast and
receive assistance from Japanese-American spies and saboteurs. See GRODZINS, supra note 116, at
129–79, 204–25, 231–302, 361–65, 371–74; IRONS, supra note 2, at 26–28, 33–64, 362–65;
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 74, 81, 87–99, 101–02, 105–24.
127. See ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 106–24 (analyzing the political, social, legal, moral, racial,
and practical aspects of the evacuation decision and concluding that FDR acted more out of
indifference to Japanese Americans than malice towards them).
128. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 168–69.
129. See IRONS, supra note 2, at 25–64; ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 77, 84–87, 92, 94–99, 101,
104–19, 122–24, 184–85, 209–10, 257.
130. The Department of Justice deliberately suppressed evidence showing that the War
Department’s reports of Japanese-American sabotage and espionage, which were critical to the
government’s “military necessity” justification, had no factual basis. See IRONS, supra note 2, at
278–310; see also id. at 186, 202–18 (documenting similar unethical conduct in earlier related
cases).
131. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 287–91 (emphasizing that the racial bigotry of certain
subordinate executive officials, such as General DeWitt, cannot necessarily be attributed to the
“higher ups” who ultimately made wartime decisions, most notably Roosevelt).
132. To be clear, I am attempting to provide a rational explanation for Roosevelt’s initial decision
to evacuate Japanese Americans in the chaotic aftermath of Pearl Harbor. By contrast, I find totally
inexcusable the President’s failure to free these detainees in early 1944 after his military advisers
informed him that there was no longer any military necessity for the internment. See IRONS, supra
note 2, at 269–77, 365. FDR delayed consideration of their liberation to gain a partisan advantage
for Democratic candidates in the November 1944 elections, and only then began the process of
closing the prison camps. Id.
Moreover, this background helps us understand the relatively limited significance of
Korematsu’s companion case, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
Endo argued that the federal War Relocation Authority (WRA) had violated her Fifth Amendment
Due Process right to liberty by holding her without charges and without challenging her claim of
loyalty to the United States. Id. at 298–302. The Court avoided this constitutional issue by ruling
that Congress had failed to authorize detention of such patriotic Americans. Id. at 297, 300–04.
This statutory construction seems preposterous, as Congress had approved and funded precisely such
undifferentiated imprisonment with FDR’s backing. Nonetheless, this interpretive move exonerated
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its result as a political and pragmatic matter. As in the Civil War cases, a
powerful President with broad congressional support had made a major
decision in seeming violation of the Constitution because he had concluded
that this drastic action was essential to win a high-stakes war, and he would
likely defy any judicial decree to desist.
Nonetheless, I believe that such political realities should not have led
the Court to uphold on the merits a presidential measure that was of such
dubious constitutionality, because doing so affirmatively legitimated
Roosevelt’s conduct and tarnished the Court’s reputation.133 Rather, the
Court should have dismissed the case on political question grounds by
conceding that it could not meaningfully review the President’s exercise of
his Article II power to take actions that he believed were militarily necessary
based on the expert advice of his executive subordinates, who possessed
extensive (and often secret) information.134 Admittedly, a dismissal
predicated on justiciability would have been cowardly, but that result would
have been preferable to what the Court actually did.
Overall, at first glance, Korematsu seems to be an obviously awful
decision. However, deeper research into the situation facing Roosevelt in
the early 1940s and the Court’s historical record in war powers cases helps
to explain, if not justify, the Korematsu opinion.
3. The Cycle Continues: The Cold War and the War on Terrorism
After FDR had died, the epic crisis of World War II had ended, and the
unpopular Harry Truman had become President, the Court reasserted
itself.135 Most famously, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,136 six

Congress and the President of violating the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans by shifting
responsibility to a small agency, the WRA. See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1038–
39. Furthermore, the Court postponed the release of its Endo judgment until the day after FDR
announced he would end the internment. Id. at 1039 n.148 and accompanying text.
In short, Endo involved only one petitioner, and future requests for habeas writs would be
moot because the Japanese Americans were being freed. Furthermore, neither Endo nor Korematsu
held that these persons’ constitutional rights had been transgressed by Roosevelt. Thus, the Court
did not dare to challenge the constitutional validity of the President’s actions or order him to do
anything against his will.
133. I flesh out this position in Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1081–83.
134. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (relying on
this rationale to contend that the case should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable, but asserting that
the Court, having exercised jurisdiction, should have invalidated the exclusion order because it
violated the detainees’ constitutional rights). I would confine my “political question” expedient to
unusual and extreme situations such as that presented in Korematsu.
135. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315–23 (1946) (interpreting an Act of
Congress that imposed martial law in Hawaii as prohibiting the Executive Branch from using
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Justices rejected Truman’s claim of Article II power to order the seizure and
operation of domestic steel mills in response to a nationwide strike that
jeopardized steel production critical to fighting the Korean War.137 Even
though Lincoln and Roosevelt had successfully seized private property as
part of their war efforts,138 the Court apparently concluded that (1) the
Korean War was not that important and that Truman’s order was
unnecessary; (2) taking property was an egregious Fifth Amendment
violation; and (3) Truman lacked the congressional and popular support to
resist the Court’s judgment.139
During the next half century, however, the usual posture of judicial
deference returned.140 Furthermore, I do not believe that the Court would
have dared challenge George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Rather, a majority of Justices waited until the
emergency had passed, and Bush’s popularity had plunged,141 before
proclaiming that his treatment of “enemy combatants” had needlessly
violated important federal statutory and due process standards.142 Although
constitutional law professors like Chemerinsky hailed these decisions as
portending a new age of vigorous judicial enforcement of individual rights
against Presidents during wartime, the lesson of history is that the Court will
be unable to maintain this momentum if a popular President takes drastic
action in a serious military crisis.143
military commissions to try loyal citizens who had been charged with ordinary crimes that had no
impact on national security).
136. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
137. See id. at 582–89; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1042–44
(examining Youngstown).
138. See supra notes 86, 93, 107 and accompanying text.
139. See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1043–44 (supporting each of these points).
140. See id. at 1044–45 (citing relevant cases).
141. See Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, at 690–91, 695 (documenting Bush’s waning
popularity at the time of each of the Court’s major decisions).
142. The key cases, in chronological order, are: Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–85 (2004)
(interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute as extending to petitions filed by alien detainees held
in the United States-controlled prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, despite contrary precedent); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–39 (2004) (holding that indefinitely detained “enemy combatants”
who were American citizens had a due process right to notice and a hearing before an impartial
decisionmaker); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566–95 (2006) (creatively construing an Act of
Congress that appeared to repeal the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay prisoners
and to authorize the President to try them by military commissions as not intended to do these two
things); and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (concluding, for the first time, that the
Constitution’s privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked by noncitizen enemy
combatants who have been captured and detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States). With the exception of Hamdi, all of these cases contain dubious legal reasoning. See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or
Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1999–2051 (2009) [hereinafter Pushaw,
Creating] (providing an extensive critique of these decisions).
143. See Pushaw, Creating, supra note 142, at 1976–81, 2046–50. One of the lessons that Dean
Chemerinsky draws from Korematsu is that detention should only be based on individualized
suspicion of a crime. He assails the Bush and Obama Administrations for imprisoning hundreds of
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III. CONCLUSION
As our debate over Korematsu illustrates, Dean Chemerinsky and I have
adopted quite different approaches to constitutional law. He believes that
the Court should use the Constitution instrumentally to identify and protect
rights that embody liberal ideals of social and moral justice. By contrast, I
adhere to a “Neo-Federalist” methodology, which seeks to restrain the
Justices’ discretion by requiring them to (1) formulate rules of law that are
rooted in the Constitution’s language, structure, history, and early precedent;
and (2) apply such rules without regard to whether they conform to the
Justices’ ideology or politics. I believe that a Neo-Federalist perspective
would clarify and improve almost all areas of constitutional law.
One notable exception is judicial review of the exercise of war powers.
Although my textual and historical approach provides some valuable
insights on this subject, I readily confess that it does not yield workable legal
principles that can be applied consistently and apolitically. Indeed, I have
concluded that this problem is intractable because each military situation is
unique and raises myriad legal, political, and pragmatic considerations that
resist facile lawyerly categorization and analysis.
It is against this backdrop that I have examined Dean Chemerinsky’s
seemingly irrefutable argument that Korematsu is one of the worst decisions
in American history. My modest purpose has been to explain, not defend,
Korematsu. I have tried to show that this case follows a historical pattern in
which the Court treats constitutional rights and liberties with far less respect
during military crises.
The Justices have always properly recognized that the Constitution
commits all war powers to the political branches, which have a paramount
duty to protect national security. Even when the assertion of those powers
allegedly violates individual rights, the Court has tended to defer to the
President’s judgment that a particular action is militarily necessary, which
rests upon the expert advice of his executive subordinates who have
people in Guantanamo Bay without such probable cause and without affording them a meaningful
due process hearing. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 171.
This criticism overlooks two important points. First, although citizens who have committed
ordinary crimes domestically enjoy the benefits of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, alien enemy
combatants who have been captured and are being detained outside of the United States do not. See
Pushaw, Creating, supra note 142, at 2005–08, 2014–17, 2022–44. Second, Congress has provided
such detainees with comprehensive administrative and judicial review (including the right to appeal
to the Supreme Court)—indeed, the most elaborate legal protections ever granted to military
prisoners. See id. at 2008–10, 2020–21, 2033, 2042. Pursuant to these procedures, hundreds of
these men have been released, and at least thirty of them have committed further acts of terrorism.
Id. at 2044. Their victims should be kept in mind as America determines how best to deal with
suspected enemy combatants.
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processed huge amounts of information. Furthermore, the Court often has
no realistic option but to yield to a strong President who enjoys popular and
congressional support when he makes such decisions.
Thus, Korematsu is not an aberration, but rather followed precedent set
during the Civil War (such as The Prize Cases and Vallandigham) and
World War I.144 My study of history convinces me that it is simply wishful
thinking to hope that the Court will avoid similar decisions in the future.

144. See supra notes 84–101 and accompanying text (discussing such decisions).
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